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Red Aesthetics, Intermediality and the
Use of Posters in Chinese Cinema after
1949
STEPHANIE HEMELRYK DONALD*
The University of Liverpool
Abstract: This article focuses on the aesthetic and affective techniques of
saturation through which posters legitimated the Party-State in Mao’s China by
closing the gap between everyday experience and political ideology. Propaganda
posters were designed to put into practice the principle of unity, as conceptua-
lised by Mao Zedong. The argument posits that while the “poster” is normally a
printed edition of a painting or design intended for mass distribution in this way,
the term may fairly be deployed to capture other cultural objects that function as
“posters”, in that they provide public, political information that expresses or con-
structs a political self in aesthetic form. This approach requires a metonymic
understanding of a visual ﬁeld in which cultural objects are interrelated and
mutually reinforcing. The essay draws on recent in-depth interviews with poster
artists of the 1960s and 1970s.
Keywords: China, PRC, Mao, posters, red art, revolutionary ﬁlm, aesthetics,
slogans, intermediality
Introduction
In their heyday, in the decades after Liberation in 1949, revolutionary posters mediated
the relationship between Party propaganda and everyday experience in the People’s
Republic of China. These “weapons of mass communication” constituted a “red sea”,
an immersive aesthetic ﬁeld through which the Party disseminated extraordinarily pow-
erful visual metaphors for the revolution-in-progress. It is important to note that this
“red sea” of mass communication included writings, slogans, sounds, images and paint-
ings that were explicitly designed as revolutionary propaganda (such as Mao Zedong’s
writings, the “model” operas espoused by his third wife, Jiang Qing, and the didactic
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“big character” posters of the late 1960s), as well as works and even historical events
and cultural myths, many of which became part of the cultural production of the
revolution by being re-imagined and repurposed speciﬁcally to convey socio-political
messages to the masses (Clark, 2008; Evans and Donald, 1999). Accordingly, the term
“poster” is here deployed metonymically and should be understood to encapsulate
the entire visual and aural “sea” of which the mass-produced poster was but the
pre-eminent form (Andrews, 2010; Laing, 2004; Wang, 2002).1
Before launching into this topic, a few words on the provenance of posters are in
order. Some were designed by individual artists or created as paintings and then distrib-
uted as mass-produced posters. Individual artists might produce an iconic image that
was then reproduced as a poster (such as Shen Jiawei’s ‘Defending the Fatherland’
(1973) or Dai Ze’s ‘The Great Victory at Langfang’ (1975, Figure 1), while others
developed specialisations, such as Ou Yang and her portraits of “good children” in the
mid-1960s (Powell and Wong, 1997). Many, however, were created by committee (see,
for example, Figure 4). Although Mao Zedong called for posters to be both popular
(puji) and of a high standard aesthetically (tigao), their artistic quality was highly vari-
able (Andrews and Shen, 1998). More consistent was their function as an insistent
voice offering information, motivation and advice, simultaneously representing the
energy and direction of the Party amongst the people and telling the people how they
might best serve the Party. Even if an individual artist’s painting had not been speciﬁ-
cally designed to be wholly didactic, its release at a particular time or with particular
imprimaturs (say, the approval of Jiang Qing in the case of Shen Jiawei’s 1973
‘Defending the Fatherland’) would nonetheless make it so.2
Figure 1. ‘The Great Victory at Langfang’, Dai Ze, 1975. Shanghai People’s Publishing House.
Photograph: the author. Courtesy: University of Westminster
2 Stephanie Hemelryk Donald
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Mao’s Unity: Politics and Art; Ideology and the People
Chinese propaganda posters and related image forms used aesthetic and affective
techniques that helped legitimate the Party-State by closing the gap between everyday
Figure 2. Market “sketching” scene, Five Golden Blossoms
Figure 3. Villagers read the manifesto, Li Shuangshuang
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experience and political ideology. Propaganda posters were designed to create a new
type of “political” subject wholly identiﬁed with the State, without any interruption of
“social” responses such as critique, desire, irony or resistance. They were supposed to
put into practice the aesthetic-political principle of unity, as conceptualised by Mao.
“What we demand is the unity of politics and art,” wrote Mao in 1942; “the unity of
content and form, the unity of revolutionary political content and the highest possible
perfection of artistic form” (Chang, 1980, p. 7). I do not suggest that this overweening
ambition was ever perfectly achieved in the complex social ﬂux of the People’s Repub-
lic of China, but rather that its attempt was conﬁdently asserted and, to a signiﬁcant
degree, was made effective through close political controls over artists’ careers, controls
that intensiﬁed in the late 1960s and early 1970s.
Mao’s expectation of “unity” has been variously interpreted both by artists and by
commentators of socialist realism in China, and it is worth brieﬂy reviewing these cri-
tiques before turning to the speciﬁc topic of this paper. In an early consideration of pro-
paganda, Jacques Ellul draws a connection between the “psychological collusion of
opinion” between transmitter and receiver, and the use of media as an “informational
device” (Ellul, 1957, p. 65). He argues that information in and of itself requires propa-
ganda or, as a media analyst might say today, a consistent news agenda. The more that
is happening, the more the masses need some narrative of events to make sense of the
changes both to which they are subject and which they are themselves enacting.
Although Ellul (1957, p. 65) is not referring speciﬁcally to socialist realism, his
Figure 4. Detail from ‘Down with Soviet Revisionists’, 1967. Collection: University of
Westminster. Artists: Department of Shanghai Publishing System Revolutionary Rebel Command,
Propaganda Department of the Revolutionary Rebel Committee of the Shanghai People’s Art
Publishing
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observation is nonetheless pertinent to understanding how Maoist propaganda appealed
to the masses, and why it became a deeply embedded “collusion of opinion”. Just a
few years later, in 1964, John Wilson Lewis wrote of the Chinese situation that the
socialist realist mode of propaganda needed to be re-imagined to appeal to youth. Such
a reconﬁguration would be a move away from the unity of form and content that had
resulted in the “red and expert” debates of the late 1950s. To achieve “redness”, a con-
trived political struggle had to be inserted into socialist realism as the primary point of
reference and value. Technical knowledge and scientiﬁc approaches were secondary.
Wilson Lewis (1965, p. 145) felt that the price of Mao’s legacy would prove too high
for the youth of the day and that they would resist “the propagation of revolutionary
struggle”. His instinct has proven true of later generations, although not through the
simple break with socialist realism that he may have envisaged. In the Cultural Revolu-
tion, however, redness won out and youth were co-opted to struggle in the sphere of an
idealised realism. By the late 1960s, a few years after Lewis was writing, ideal redness
was ampliﬁed through the Cultural Revolution and particularly through the further per-
verse reduction of realism to idealised form by Mao’s wife, Jiang Qing, and the cultural
works that she approved as beneﬁcial to her own political sense of revolutionary value.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the image of Mao became fetishised and subject to
rules that underlined the neurotic version of revolutionary correctness in the aesthetics
of Jiang Qing’s period of ascendancy, but even then Julia Andrews sees the images as
hybrid. Mao had to be “red, smooth and luminescent” [and] “while Soviet socialist
realism is still the most evident stylistic source for such compositions, details of color
and texture may also be related to the more elegant of pre-Liberation new year’s
pictures” (Andrews, 1994, p. 360).
Other critics have explained socialist realism as an aesthetic within a larger tradition
of moral education. Perris notes that art for art’s sake is not a comfortable concept in
Chinese cultural production, where ideological or moral value is assumed within the
aesthetic process. He suggests that this has been the case for several centuries, and one
would indeed note that it was at its apogee in the Confucian Book of Ritual (li ji)
(second century BCE). As Perris (1983, p. 16) puts it, “the Chinese tradition supports
[author note: i.e. and has long supported] the twin functions of aesthetic enjoyment and
ideological construction”. Poster expert and collector Stefan Landsberger has traced the
use of models as repositories of moral value across 60 years of Communist rule. He
points out that the groundwork for the unity of form and content lies in the relation
between orthodoxy and orthopraxy in traditional Chinese thought and social action
(Landsberger, 2001, p. 541). Neither Perris nor Landsberger, however, conceive of the
Jiang Qing aesthetic period as so marked by political narcissism that it exceeded the
bounds of morality, ritual and the modelling of virtue. It is at this point that my argu-
ment differs from these accounts of the shifting meaning of realism in socialist realism
over the ﬁrst three decades of the People’s Republic. In this regard it is relevant to con-
sider the ways in which “unity” and “psychosis” might be aligned as co-respondents in
regimes that actively seek homogeneity of artistic expression. The observations on
totalitarianism and art practice made by the art historian and philosopher Boris Groys
are relevant here. Groys (2011, p. 36) has traced the trajectory of revolutionary modern-
ism from oppositional avant-gardism to the centralising project of Stalinism; “the Stalin
era,” he notes, “satisﬁed the fundamental avant-garde demand that art cease represent-
ing life and begin transforming it by means of a total aesthetic-political project”.
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D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
by
 [U
niv
ers
ity
 of
 L
ive
rp
oo
l],
 [P
ro
fes
so
r S
tep
ha
nie
 H
em
elr
yk
 D
on
ald
] a
t 1
8:1
8 0
2 O
cto
be
r 2
01
4 
Uniﬁcation is also addressed by Claude Lefort’s account of the bureaucracy in
totalitarian states. He argues that, in principle, men in the bureaucratic class had
absolute power in society but at the same time, no power at all except that yielded by
their jobs. They constituted therefore a class that was both without limits and utterly
vulnerable to the whims of the leadership (Lefort, 2007, pp. 117–18). The narcissism
of the totalitarian project is thus both immense and banal, leading on the one hand to
the totalisation of approved aesthetic practice, and on the other to the total evacuation
by the leadership of individuated responsibility in the everyday operation of power.
Unity and Red Aesthetics in Revolutionary Poster Art: ‘The Great Victory at
Langfang’
The characteristic visual grammar of persuasive design and its deployment for political
and patriotic ends used by some posters can be exempliﬁed by ‘The Great Victory at
Langfang’ (1975, Figure 1), which was a painting widely reproduced and disseminated
to schools as a poster. The original was painted by Dai Ze, who was born in 1922 and
trained at Beijing’s Central Art Academy in the early 1940s, where he acquired a work-
ing knowledge of the European masters and of Western drawing techniques. The paint-
ing’s historical reference is the Boxer Rebellion of 1900–01, and the victory over
imperialist forces at Langfang in 1900. The composition of ‘The Great Victory at
Langfang’ is along a left-to-right downward diagonal. On the left, the Boxer troops are
shown bearing down on the imperialist troops, who cower in the right-hand corner. In
typical Cultural Revolution style, the Boxers are wearing red, their skin tone is reddish,
and their bodies are square and muscular. The imperialists are wearing white, the colour
of death and of imperialism, and are small, thin and weak. These are the same physical
attributes accorded to Japanese and Nationalist troops in other poster art, animations
and feature ﬁlms.
The dominant ﬁgure is the ﬁghter moving directly forwards with a long spear in the
foreground of the painting. Not only is this ﬁgure easily the largest, his spear provides
the horizontal balance around which the rest of the painting is constructed. He, too, is
entirely dressed in red, and his red skin tone is intended to indicate how the Boxer
Rebellion preﬁgured the Maoist-Marxist-Leninist Revolution. That dual temporality is
also implied by the “gua” symbol on his chest, which indicates the water sign from the
Book of Changes (Yi jing). The Boxers regarded the Book of Changes as a sacred text,
and its staunch Chineseness continued to commend itself to the anti-foreign thinking of
Chinese revolutionaries, modernists and reformers throughout the twentieth century.
The Book of Changes also had the political grace of not being aligned to Confucianism,
and so the “gua” symbol may be read as Dai Ze’s (Cohen, 1997, pp. 261–69) nod to
the anti-Confucian campaign of the mid-1970s, when he was painting ‘The Great
Victory at Langfang’. Indeed, Cohen has written a detailed account of the mythologisa-
tion of the Boxers and the re-historicisation of the Red Lantern movement in Tianjin
during the Cultural Revolution.
What is distinctive about the painting, however, and somewhat unusual for a poster of
its time, is Dai Ze’s allusion to a revolutionary image from the European tradition: to
“Marianne”, the feminine embodiment of the French Revolution in Eugene Delacroix’s
‘Liberty Leading the People’ (1830). Formally, the equivalent to “Marianne” in this
6 Stephanie Hemelryk Donald
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painting is the male Boxer leader. He is centrally positioned, and he is depicted with his
romantically torn white shirt slipping down to reveal his chest, and with his muscular
sword-arm ﬂung up and backwards. The woman ﬁghter in the centre foreground is not a
“Marianne”, but is a home-grown revolutionary allusion: she is most likely an evocation
of the all-female Boxer Red Lantern ﬁghters. The positioning of the woman “Red
Lantern” ﬁghter underlines how contemporary politics determined the painting’s execu-
tion. Iconographically, she is modelled on a 1900 Red Lantern warrior, but being fully
clothed in red, this ﬁgure’s physiognomy is similar to faces painted to represent Red
Guards elsewhere in the Cultural Revolution canon, even though by this time Red Guard
groups and factions had been disbanded. As a peasant woman following a male Boxer,
however, she foreshadows the expectation that women were to be liberated through the
leadership of the Party after 1949, speciﬁcally through the anti-Confucian movement of
1975 and the gender politics promoted by Jiang Qing, Mao’s third wife and a former
actress. Mythologisation of the Boxer Red Lantern group had already been linked to
Qing’s gender politics, through her attempt to control perceptions of her own theatrical
career and to legitimise her political standing by supporting another Red Lantern, the
model opera ﬁlm from 1967. This was previously a stage opera but, as Zhang Ling
(2010, p. 68) notes, “The ﬁlm The Red Lantern, however, is in no way a visual record
or documentation of the stage performance” and was indeed a ground-breaking exercise
in aesthetic dogmatism. The ﬁlm tells of a combined family of revolutionaries in the
anti-Japanese war who, although not actually related to one another by blood, are con-
nected through their zeal and righteousness. The secret sign of these revolutionaries is a
red lantern, hence the title. Zhang (2010, p. 69) argues that “the excessive revolutionary
visual rhetoric presented by body movements, facial expressions and hand gestures,
combined with the close-ups and the proximity between the camera and the human
body, suggest a strong sense of the corporeality and materiality of the body on the
screen”, and this focus on extreme idealised bodies is a common theme to ‘The Great
Victory at Langfang’ and Red Lantern and to the representations of the Boxers that were
speciﬁcally and deliberately referenced in both.
Past and present are thus co-temporal and co-spatial in ‘The Great Victory at
Langfang’. Historical ﬁgures are depicted as corporeal mutual referents to drive home
contemporary political messages. Although the poster’s function was to achieve
aesthetic and political goals, its form also implies a dialogue with other mass media
and other artistic traditions with shared goals, and it thus represents an instance of
intermediality.
Unifying Politics and Art: The Deployment of Posters in Film
Given the overwhelming breadth of possibilities in discussing socialist realist aesthetics
in China, this article will now concentrate primarily on the use of posters in ﬁlms. Of
course, the combination of posters with ﬁlms complicates the story, as well as narrowing
its scope. Attention to the intermedial deployment of posters in ﬁlm elaborates not just
the connections between art forms, but also the shifting relations between art and politics
across the 1950s–90s. Tracing and interpreting the presence of posters in ﬁlm assumes
(correctly) that set dressing and set design (and thus the appearance or non-appearance
of posters and the choice of particular posters and related images, writings or fragments)
Red Aesthetics in Chinese Cinema after 1949 7
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are deliberative narrational tools. In other words, the placing of objects in the frame is
neither random nor simply contingent on what is to hand, but is a choreographed ele-
ment of the mise-en-scène. To understand this through the lens of ﬁlm theory one might
re-visit Stephen Heath’s seminal work on narrative space, and the work of those who
have developed his insights (Heath, 1976; Cooper, 2002). Heath makes the point that an
image within an image both admits and contains the excess of meaning beyond the
cinematic frame. What is in the frame gives meaning to what is presumed to be outside
it, and one frame is understood in relation to others with which it is juxtaposed. This is,
of course, the main point of editing. Thus, if a key protagonist is repeatedly positioned
in a frame that is co-occupied by a poster, and that shot is juxtaposed with one of a
protagonist without a poster, the contrast is intended and meaningful, as I will discuss
later with reference to Ren Lu’s ﬁlm Li Shuangshuang (1962).
While realist ﬁlmmakers typically try to create a contained, continuous narrative
space in order to persuade the viewer to suspend disbelief and buy into the narrative,
control over spatiality through framing and juxtaposition characterises an avant-garde
approach that may seek to disrupt previously held notions of spatial coherence
(Farquhar, 1992). A frame within a frame can function to further extend the apparent
continuity of narrative space through offering a window of contradiction, or to create
further compression through repeating and over-determining the political aspect of the
foregrounded main action. As I argue below, when posters were used to make comment
or to offer didactic direction within the narrational frame, one might assume that some
kind of oppositional reading was still possible. In those instances that the poster and
the ﬁlm image become almost impossible to distinguish from each other, the subjective
gap between ideal and action can be said to have shrunk so far in the visual ﬁeld of
meaning that a form of aesthetic psychosis is in play. The argument of this paper is,
then, that exchanges between cinematic and poster “stills” were present throughout
decades of Chinese cinema but that the “excess signiﬁcation” initiated by frames within
the frame reached a point of subjective disappearance, or what we may term “pure
politics”, in ﬁlms made at the apogee of the Jiang Qing era, 1969–74.
After 1949, Chinese ﬁlmmakers had to negotiate a steady, but sometimes erratic, pat-
ter of ideological advice. The advice reﬂected the various movements, inconsistencies
and sudden crackdowns associated with the Chinese Communist Party’s attempts to
manage cinema and control its consequences during the successive periods of cinematic
production. First, there was a period of 17 years of consolidation, the era of pure politics
that culminated in the decade of the Cultural Revolution (1966–76). Second, the Party
gave itself a difﬁcult and somewhat contradictory task in managing the post-1978
Reform era of marketised politics, including the changes that followed the demonstra-
tions and massacre in Tiananmen in 1989 (Ward, 2011). Throughout all these
vicissitudes, however, both posters and cinema, and the mise-en-scène of posters in ﬁlm,
can be seen as experimental and pragmatic iterations of a persistent political-aesthetic
challenge: how might a popular aesthetic be devised that would promulgate and embed,
at an affective level, the principles of revolution in a Maoist-Marxist-Leninist state? The
response to this question was that a reasonably straightforward didactic or pedagogic
deployment of posters in the ﬁlms of the consolidation period, from 1949 until about
1966, increasingly gave way, during the Cultural Revolution, to the narcissistic aesthetic
of pure politics.
8 Stephanie Hemelryk Donald
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The Function of the Revolutionary Poster as a “Frame within a Frame”
In cinema, the combination of projected image with soundtrack renders the experience
of ﬁlm inherently intermedial – that is, its meanings and pleasures are generated by the
interactions between more than one medium. (Even the projection of a silent ﬁlm to a
live musical accompaniment is a form of intermediality.) Beyond the technology, the
history of cinematic narration reveals a frequent use of references to other media of
communication, technologies of speech, and the arts generally, as a means of intensify-
ing the expressivity of a sequence or shot. The convention also acts as a way of regis-
tering the speciﬁcity, distinctiveness and artiﬁce of the medium: Hollywood’s
relentlessly disdainful allusions to television from the 1950s through the 1980s are a
case in point. In Chinese cinema since 1949, and especially in a number of ﬁlms in the
1970s, the poster has fulﬁlled an analogous function, although to very different ends.
Posters in Chinese ﬁlms provide a frame within the frame, introducing a second register
of reality, which is not so much contained in the screen image as it is lodged in the
symbolic realm of political power. As noted above, posters in Chinese ﬁlms thus func-
tion as intermedial interventions. Although often plausible as part of the diegesis, the
posters carry an extra-diegetic authority that incorporates and exceeds mere set design
and mise-en-scène. The process is comparable to the operation of micro- and macro-
narratives in Chinese arts and literature. As Andrew Plaks (1976, pp. 86–87) has dem-
onstrated in relation to the Chinese canon, allegory and correspondence combine to
deliver quite substantial and grounded meaning through a visual or written text. The
posters clearly import the macro-narrative of Chinese society, political authority and
social harmony into the ﬁlms. On the micro-narrative level, the posters often appear to
make the agency of characters contingent less on psychological motivation than on the
iconic presence of Party and Leader (Donald, 1997; Hawkes, 2010).
Between the 1950s and the 1970s, the propaganda poster was also intermedial insofar
as it was consumed in relation to other media, notably radio broadcasts, public meetings
and information boards, and ﬁlm.3 All communication aimed at rural or mass audiences,
rather than intellectuals or Party elites, was designed to be direct and uncluttered. Many
Chinese were still functionally illiterate, and most had limited time to read extensively or
to consider the subtleties of scholarly art forms. Films were screened in cinemas in large
cities and distributed to rural areas through mobile ﬁlm troupes. Arguably, posters were
the ﬁrst and most accessible visual address from the Party and ﬁlm was the second,
whereas radio, delivered through inescapable loudspeakers, was the most insistent. On
radio, the voice of authority was direct and often issued immediate instructions. Interme-
diality was performative or referential: “performative”, if villagers then felt obliged to
march around their village repeating the instructions, and “referential”, if large character or
printed posters reiterated or contextualised those instructions. On ﬁlm, however, the narra-
tive suture of a collective socialist subject, through the aestheticisation (meihua) of
socialist perfection, was powerfully combined with the authority represented by the poster.
From Pedagogy to Psychosis
A selection of three examples is sufﬁcient to illustrate how posters were deployed in
ﬁlm in the period between Liberation and the beginning of the Cultural Revolution.
What becomes apparent is a trajectory from political didacticism to pure politics.
Red Aesthetics in Chinese Cinema after 1949 9
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Nülan wuhao, or Girl Basketball Player No. 5 (dir. Xie Jin, 1957) is set in a sports
training centre, and the focus is on self-improvement in the pursuit of national glory.
This message is reinforced by four posters shown in the course of the ﬁlm. They are
deployed, unambiguously, to informative and pedagogical ends. The ﬁrst poster sets the
scene for the ﬁlm’s national and ideological frame of reference. It presents a direct
quote from Mao: “Strengthen people’s health”. The next two posters reinforce the gen-
dered aspirations of Girl Basketball Player No. 5 – the ﬁlm’s basketball player protago-
nist is a young woman (nü qingnian). The second, hanging in the centre’s admission
hall, shows a woman on a motorcycle. The third is a poster for the 1956 Olympics,
with the image of a sportswoman anchored by the caption: 运动员们为祖国争取荣誉
(“Athletes, win glory for your country”; Yundongyuanmen wei zuguo zhengqu rongyu).
The fourth poster shows a woman athlete running, with the national ﬂag of the People’s
Republic streaming behind her. The didacticism of these posters is transparent and
unapologetic.
Two very different ﬁlms made in 1959, Lin Family Shop (Linjia puzi, dir. Shui
Hua)4 and Five Golden Blossoms (Wuduo jinhua, dir. Wang Jiayi), both make
extensive use of decorative arts, such as wall hangings and posters, for more subtle
pedagogic ends. Lin Family Shop is set in a small town in 1931. Although ostensibly
about the moral failings of the bourgeoisie, the ﬁlm deals most effectively with the
everyday challenges of the small-business owner and the impact of war on family
life. (It thus inherits some features of the Shanghai city melodramas of the 1930s.)
The Lin family lives in a comfortable house behind their shop, clearly distinguished
from the street lives of refugees and the poor. The business is still part of a credit-
based mercantilist system, and Mr Lin defaults on his poorer creditors when he
cannot repay his loans to a bank. In most sequences in which he discusses money
matters with his creditors or debtors, Mr Lin is framed by landscape paintings on the
wall, indicating his taste and bourgeois status even in the face of ruin. The ﬁlm’s use
of decorative hanging scrolls does two things: it recalls that art in domestic environ-
ments was the norm prior to the introduction of political posters for domestic
consumption; it also underlines how, when calligraphic texts and moral injunctions
are displayed, the line between pure decoration and domestic pedagogy is already
blurred. Mr Lin’s residual and reprehensible conservatism is thus conveyed, within
the ﬁlm, by his aesthetic preferences. Even so, and despite intertitles and voice-overs
instructing the audience to condemn him for these failings, Xie Tian’s gentle and
persuasive performance of Mr Lin still renders the protagonist as not inherently evil
and as personally likeable. As a result, Lin Family Shop was criticised for its bour-
geois sympathies. Xie Tian himself found his acting career stalled, further indication
of the critics’ desire to see the gap between performativity, ontology and ideological
absolutes closed.
Set among the minority Bai people in Yunnan, Five Golden Blossoms tells the story
of a young man, Ah Peng, who returns to seek his lover, Jinhua, after a year’s absence.
It is a “lost-and-found” romantic comedy of errors, set against the backdrop of the
Great Leap Forward and the steel production drive. There are ﬁve girls called “Jinhua”
in the two regions where Ah Peng searches, but eventually he locates the right girl.
She also turns out to be the most politically advanced of the ﬁve: she is a deputy com-
mune leader. The romance unfolds in a fever of political activity, national development
and the rollout of communications technology. Posters and slogan banners, with their
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white writing on red backgrounds, appear more frequently than in Girl Basketball
Player No. 5, reﬂecting the stridency of the second Five Year Plan, for 1958 to 1962.
Posters picturing minority people provide a backdrop to scenes in which Bai characters
are working, arguing or romancing.
The overall effect of these ﬁlms is to bring about an over-determined appropria-
tion of both individual and collective Bai subjectivity, seen most powerfully in the
ﬁlm’s ﬁnal market scene. A Han engineer, who features in a subplot about the arri-
val of telephone technology, stands sketching the head of a Bai woman. She is
watching a public entertainment, and seems oblivious to his attentions. The shot is
framed so that the ﬁlm’s spectators look over his shoulder at the drawing, but no
diegetic Bai protagonists register the incident. The sketch is, of course, both an
idealised representation of the woman in the ﬁlm, and a variation on the theme of
idealised representations of the minority workers in the rest of the ﬁlm, and in
China more generally. Most strikingly, although the mise-en-scène suggests that the
engineer is sketching from life, he is in fact creating an image that resembles less
his living model than the dress and features of the Bai already embedded in the
imagination of the majority Han Chinese. So, in a certain sense his sketch does
seem accurate but the sketch and the woman are simultaneously imagined. Neither
precedes the other. The presumption of the ﬁlm is that the poster images will teach
both spectators and protagonists about the capacities and appearance of ethnicity.
The sketching scene conﬁrms the absolute prerogative of the Han technicians, as
the representatives of Party-led progress, to usurp these processes of creation,
appropriation and display.
What becomes evident in Five Golden Blossoms is thus a diminishing gap between
the ﬁlm on the screen and a melodrama of pure politics. The idealisation of the minor-
ity subject, in the various poster images of Bai men and women, turns the ﬁve Jinhuas
encountered in the ﬁlm into endlessly reproducible and undifferentiated instances of
minority beauty and national virtue.
With its domestic scale, its cohesion of form and content, and its compelling central
performance, the exemplary poster ﬁlm from the early 1960s is, without doubt,
Li Shuangshuang. It also displays symptomatic developments in the way that posters
are embedded in the ﬁlmic text. There are three categories of poster: printed domestic
decorations in Li Shuangshuang’s home, the fragment of a poster in a communal open
space, and a manifesto written by Li Shuangshuang and posted on the village notice-
board. This is the ﬁrst ﬁlm in which the protagonist not only exempliﬁes the model
subject of the printed posters, but expresses the Party line in her own words on her
own poster.
After reaping the wheat, putting down the spade, women rest. Meanwhile they
say that there is not enough labour to dig the canal and work in the ﬁeld. Truly,
the cadres don’t want to be bothered. The work-point calculation is badly done,
and we don’t know who is actually doing the counting. We hope the job will be
done and the points allotted, and we remember that women can hold up half the
sky.5
Fellow villagers read the manifesto approvingly, particularly the women foregrounded
in the shot. The fragment of a poster of a peasant woman is stuck on the same board,
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reinforcing Li’s text with the authority of a printed slogan or directive. The remnant of
the printed image supplies the aesthetic reference through which her words claim moral
rectitude.
In the interior of her own home, it is Li herself who is framed and legitimised by
the printed image. The posters on her walls confer authority on a particular point of
view, rather as Mr Lin’s bourgeois paintings compromised him. Li Shuangshuang is the
moral centre of the ﬁlm. When she argues with her corrupt and apolitical husband, she
is positioned with either the poster of Mao in the background or, later (after her
poster-manifesto has prompted her election to the village committee), with a poster of a
peasant woman that reads, “Learn about culture and science”. The reverse shots of her
husband are framed with either a simple New Year picture or by an unadorned wall. Li
Shuangshuang can be paired directly with the poster-as-ideal-subject, as she is herself a
prime revolutionary subject from the outset. Nevertheless, Li’s status as a subject who
takes advice from others, and who has an aura of ordinariness and occasional vulnera-
bility about her, means that she is still a sane political subject rather than an articulation
of psychotic narcissism, which is arguably what we begin to encounter in the “model”
operas and ﬁlms (Hawkes, 2010, p. 76).
A Cinema of Pure Politics
In 1963, Jiang Qing reformed the Peking Opera and created eight model revolutionary
operas, which introduced a propagandistic aesthetic based on a simpliﬁed Maoist ideol-
ogy pitting exemplary farmers, workers and revolutionary soldiers against stereotypi-
cally wicked landlords and anti-revolutionaries (Roberts, 2010a; 2010b). This notion of
“model” works in opera, ballet and then ﬁlm was, in effect, her response to Mao’s
demand for “the unity of politics and art” and “the unity of revolutionary political con-
tent and the highest possible perfection of artistic form”. In this period, the previous
multifocal relationship between poster and ﬁlm collapsed, brieﬂy, into a cinema of pure
politics.
In the political mineﬁeld of the Cultural Revolution, poster aesthetics were likewise
subordinated to the Party line. By 1967, posters provided their viewers with starkly
delineated “pro” and “anti” positions encouraging correct thinking and behaviour and
denouncing incorrect thinking and behaviour. An example such as ‘Down with Soviet
Revisionists’ (Figure 4) is drenched in redness, and uses wide variations in scale and
miniaturisation in order to demonstrate moral hierarchies between revolutionaries and
revisionists.
In the frenzied political atmosphere of 1967–68, the compulsion to communicate
new and immediately important political statements, factional positions and collective
denouncements changed the nature of posters. Words written directly on paper and thus
unmediated by either a formal design or print production process often pre-empted the
more formalised red-and-black posters. These three-colour printed productions of red,
black and white, which had themselves streamlined and to an extent brutalised political
imagery, were made increasingly redundant in the face of the viscerally scribed
“Word”. I deliberately capitalise “Word” to indicate the way in which these edicts were
intended by those who were writing, whether on paper or on walls or on blackboards
around the country, to be closest to the word of power, if not to that of an absolute
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deity. In these “big character” posters (dazibao), the image was supposed to express
literally the will of the Leader, or the faction closest to him. These posters represented,
and incited, extreme aggression. The design is agitated and explicit, as if to admit that
the posters’ political authority is both absolute and uncertain. It also calls to mind
Dovring’s (1959, p. 100) theory of propaganda, wherein “agitation is the preparation
for propaganda [or] propaganda is the purpose of agitation”. The posters often
denounced individuals and called for their death, but they also announced and spurred
on the death of other less visible counter-revolutionaries among the population (whether
by murder or suicide). This violence is typically reduced to a metonym, often a ﬁst or
a boot, and the victims are miniaturised, coloured white or yellow, and squashed,
pummelled, speared or thrown into free fall.
At the same time, the use of posters in ﬁlm changed. In Red Lantern (also 1967), for
example, only one poster appears: a folk-art papercut on the wall of the Grandmother’s
peasant home. This depicts a butterﬂy – a reference, most probably, to a tale of two “but-
terﬂy lovers”, Zhu Yingtai and Liang Shanbo, separated in life by misunderstanding and
patriarchy, but reunited as butterﬂies after death. The butterﬂy in the ﬁlm suggests that
the Grandmother’s own hero, her dead husband, is expecting her to sacriﬁce herself, liter-
ally or politically, to the revolutionary struggle. Films such as Red Lantern had no need
of aggressive dazibao. They had become narcissistic, in the sense that the ﬁlm-image had
become not just an expression of the Party line, but its absolute reﬂection, with no further
intermediation necessary or possible. Total authority was presented at the level of the cin-
ematic image; external symbols of authority had become redundant. The shift from the
poster as a didactic ideal to the ﬁlm subject-as-poster might be interpreted as a reversal of
the Lacanian mirror phase. When, in the earlier ﬁlms, political authority was ascribed to
the posters within the frame, this implied – and indeed required – an understanding that
ideological authority is made visible to both protagonists and spectators by the inclusion
of the posters. The recognition that the political ideal and the politicised subject are sepa-
rate – even though the latter is strongly inﬂuenced by the former – was lost in the model
ﬁlms of the Cultural Revolution period.
The implication of that loss is threefold. First, all representation was subsumed and
collapsed into the ideal or antithesis. The possibility that a subject of representation
might exist as a social subject, deﬁned through interactions with other people and with
society, was thus ruled out of court. Second, the prescriptive aesthetic principles of
poster art, under Jiang Qing, were close to, if not exactly the same as, those required
for ﬁlm characterisations. The only image, other than the “bright red, tall and shining”
(hong gao guang)6 revolutionary subject, that remained essential was the portrait of
Mao, or a metonymic sun image, which became the deﬁning standard of all other
representations. Third, slogans were still used extensively, indicating that the textual
and the visual now formed a single plane in the ﬁlm. The exegetical bond between
cinematic image and political line had become absolute.
The ﬁnal shot in Red Lantern, for example, depicts the red lantern, a symbol of rev-
olutionary duty being passed from generation to generation, superimposed on the red
ﬂag, with only the protagonist’s hand visible at the bottom of the screen. The lantern
also acts as – to use Roland Barthes’s term – the punctum of authority within the ﬁlm.
The poster aesthetic has, in effect, colonised the cinematic narrative, apparently suc-
ceeding in achieving Mao’s unity between politics and art. If it did, however, it was at
the cost of an aesthetic psychosis, whereby spectator, topic and narration came to form
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an undifferentiated, composite subject/object. In an ethos of pure politics, ﬁlms could
no longer take a distance from the posters within them, just as the social had been col-
lapsed into the political. The visual ﬁeld had only one generative point of reference:
the revolutionary Real, manifest in Mao’s image or in signs of his immanence. To rein-
force this underlying and pervasive authority, ﬁlms of this period were prefaced by
white-on-red credits that featured extended quotations from Mao’s works, thus provid-
ing a frame for understanding the visual drama to come. The ﬁlm was the poster was
the ﬁlm. In Sparkling Red Star (1974), the young boy Shanshan’s mother swears alle-
giance to Chairman Mao and, as she does so, the ﬁlm cuts to the sun rising in the East.
These shots position the spectator as the bearer of the socialist realist gaze, whereby
the Leader is assumed to be simultaneously immanent and off-screen. This concept has
been theorised as a key “psychoanalytic visualization of politics” in Maoist cinema –
elaborated by Donald (2000, pp. 135–37) and McGrath (2010, pp. 343 ff.) in discus-
sions of the socialist realist gaze. In this period of intense colour, the tonal saturation
and melodramatic metonymy induce an aesthetic closure, which effectively annihilates
the subject within the frame.
None of these observations should be taken to imply that Jiang Qing’s totalitarian
red aesthetics, and the pure politics of the poster-ﬁlm, were always (or ever) as
effective as they were intended to be. The desire of “the would-be totalitarian” for
absolute power should never be confused with its achievement. “We may laugh at
him … or psychoanalyse him,” Robert Fine wisely cautions, “but we must not take
his pretensions too seriously” (2007, p. 188). Megalomaniacs certainly exist and they
are often lethally dangerous. Fine’s point is simply that we need neither collude in
their self-deception, nor underestimate the capacity of interpolated subjects to resist
or to change when the opportunity arises. After Mao’s death, Jiang Qing’s strangle-
hold over cultural politics soon began to unravel. Cecile Lagesse has shown how the
removal of Jiang Qing was soon followed by the belated introduction of André
Bazin’s ideas about cinema into Chinese aesthetic theory in the 1980s and 1990s,
which in turn encouraged ﬁlmmakers to seek “narrative ambiguity”, “elusiveness”
and “authenticity”, and to start making use of both the long shot and the long take
(2011, p. 320). In the same spirit, Reform Era ﬁlmmakers began to experiment with
different uses of the poster, and to present at least coded critiques of the political
aesthetic of the Cultural Revolution.
Re-viewing Red Aesthetics in Reform Era Cinema
A ﬁlm from the 1990s that is explicit in its cynicism about the earlier posters, and what
they represented, is Black Snow (1990).7 Whereas the protagonists of Five Golden
Blossoms bought and sold ethnic craft objects, in Black Snow, made at a time when
capitalism and marketisation had already become more urgent than ideological purity
or class struggle, posters themselves are nothing more than commodities to be traded in
street markets. A nostalgic ﬂashback to the Black Snow protagonist’s days as a Young
Pioneer in the 1970s reinforces the irrelevance of the posters’ idealised images of
Chinese youth to the way he lives in the present. In his (urban) home there is one peel-
ing poster, which must have belonged to his mother, now passed away, but for his own
bedroom walls he has chosen pictures of Sylvester Stallone as Rambo and of scantily
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clad foreign women. These date from the 1980s, and they are seen as already dated
within the ﬁlm, reminding us that the main protagonist has been in prison over the cusp
of the decades. The political poster is thus conﬂated with more recent fetishes, and the
detail of history recedes.
The Denunciation of Uncle Shangang (1994) tells the story of an old-fashioned
village leader who gets into trouble for his rough methods of administering law and
order. When the county police ﬁrst visit him in his home, they see his many awards for
model leadership, a banner proclaiming “Be united and protect our forests, bringing
beneﬁt to our people”, and a poster of Mao in pride of place. The police go on to criti-
cise Shan in the “presence” of his hero in three separate sequences. Times have moved
on since Li Shuangshuang seized the moral high ground with her banner, and the por-
trait of Mao is no longer an effective talisman. Now, the place where Uncle Shangang
seems most at home is in the local market, surrounded by people who have known him
all his life and want to protect him from the law. These scenes depict a messy and soci-
able public arena, which provides a contrast to the stiff formality and embarrassment of
the policemen who have come to bring down an old Party man. In the ﬁnal sequence,
Shan is driven away weeping in a police van, his pride shattered. His anachronistic pol-
itics have become an embarrassment, but there is no place for him either in the social-
ity represented by the market. (Shan thus takes a similarly forlorn ideological journey
to that of Mr Lin in Lin Family Shop, although in the opposite direction.) By the
1990s, the poster in ﬁlm had come to function primarily as a comment on the political
and historical redundance of the millions who modelled themselves on the mass line,
whether the tragic village boss in Uncle Shangang or the Young Pioneer-turned-petty
criminal in Black Snow.
Conclusion
This discussion has indicated how the intermedial deployment of posters and related
visual forms in Chinese ﬁlms after 1949 might be read as a response to the dramatic
changes in the political, industrial and ideological context in which both ﬁlms and post-
ers were produced. Although unique to the case of post-Liberation China, the study
may have wider implications for historians of socialist visual production systems more
broadly, insofar as it throws up new questions about “propaganda” and the ways in
which it does or does not work – in the sense of embedding social predispositions aes-
thetically through the senses, and affectively as well as ideologically through reason,
interest and belief. Speciﬁcally, I have suggested that socialist realism in China under-
went a profound transformation in the late 1960s. It transformed from a site of cultural
production that employed the aesthetics of socialist realism to didactic moralising on
behalf of the Party and the State, to an undifferentiated aesthetic world, in which the
form and content were united without the mediation of pedagogy or any acknowledg-
ment of a world beyond the imaginary of an idealised Real. This transformation has
been traced through a reading of the use of posters in ﬁlms.
In the period between Liberation and the Cultural Revolution, ﬁlms such as Girl
Basketball Player No. 5, Lin Family Shop and Five Golden Blossoms used posters to
insert political doctrine into their stories – the ideological frame within the narrative
frame, interrupting the ﬂow of the ﬁlm but reinforcing the primacy of politics in a
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revolutionary State. Given the movement towards the 1967–75 aesthetic of pure politics
on ﬁlm, however, in hindsight it becomes apparent that the deployment of posters in
those earlier ﬁlms still allowed more dialogic levels of presumed attention and ideologi-
cal subjectivity on the part of both protagonists and spectators. Until 1967 it would still
have been possible, or even necessary, for a spectator in the audience to ask: is this
ﬁlm about politics (in the sense that its address was pedagogic and/or didactic) or is it
an aesthetic embodiment of pure politics? The theoretical question with regard to the
spectatorial relation of the presumed audience would then be: were they participating in
an act of idealisation, or were they part of a political reality, in which watching the ﬁlm
would have been as much an aesthetic acquiescence of the self, as it was a sensual
commitment to the matter of the screen?
The political absolutism and aesthetic dogmatism of the Cultural Revolution can thus
be seen as an attempt to banish the distance between spectatorial imagination and
screen image. This was the narcissism latent in Mao’s ideal of unity, the identity of pol-
itics with aesthetics so as to bind the spectator wholly into the revolutionary ideology
of Party and Leader – Walter Benjamin’s “politicisation of aesthetics” with a ven-
geance, one might say.
Notes
1. This paper contributes to scholarship on the form and changing politics of public communication in
China, although no one to date has really considered the context of the psychopathology of revolu-
tionary subject formation. Relevant international studies include Aulich (2011), Wollaeger (2006),
Herf (1994) and Bonnell (1997).
2. Also known as ‘Standing Guard for Our Great Fatherland’. For background notes see Julia F.
Andrews (1994, p. 364). Andrews was instrumental in re-establishing the work through her curato-
rial practice.
3. The examples discussed here are drawn from a sampling of 100 well-known ﬁlms produced
between 1955 and 1995.
4. This work was based on Mao Dun’s 1932 novel and play of the same name (republished 2004).
The novel deals with the impact of the 28 January incident – a short outbreak of war between Japan
and China – on a local business.
5. ‘收罢麦，放下铲，妇女在家好清闲，修渠种地劳力少，都因干部怕麻烦，工分记得太马虎，
不知谁是记分员，希望认真把分记，妇女能顶半个天’(shouba mai, fangxia chan, funü zai jia
haoqingxian, xiuqu hongdi laoli shao, douyin ganbu pa mafan, gongfen jide tai mahu, buzhi shui
shi jifenyuan, xiwang renzhen ba fenji, funü neng ding bange tian) (author’s translation).
6. The other common term was gao da quan. Both were in common usage but the ﬁrst has been
quoted to the author by several ex-poster artists who were active in the 1960s in speciﬁc relation to
changes required of them in the “re-touching” of works for approval. See Gu Xiong’s comment on
the general application of tri-phrasing (and other translations): “According to revolutionary theory,
the human body was to be depicted in an idealized manner – ‘red, smooth and luminescent’ and
‘tall, robust and perfect’…” (2010, pp. 107–08).
7. The original title Benmingnian refers to the idea that one’s birth year, which recurs every 12 years,
is not always the luckiest time.
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